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  Increasingly, in response to concerns about urban sprawl and environmental 
protection, local governments are exercising their police power to reduce the legal 
permitted density on undeveloped land.  This controversial practice, known in many parts 
of the country as “downzoning,” is generally opposed by farmers, developers and others 
whose market opportunities are limited by such action.  This paper constructs a 
theoretical model of the impact of larger minimum lot sizes on the current land prices of 
farmers and homeowners within the same community.  The theoretical model suggests 
that net losses for farmers and net gains for homeowners from downzoning are a 
reasonable, if not inevitable, expectation.  Following Pelzman, Hahn, and Campos, the 
paper then develops a model to explain the public choice decision-making process that 
leads to downzoning by local public officials.  This model is tested using data on 214 
New Jersey municipalities.  The probability of downzoning is found to increase when 
there is a lot of open space to protect, but only when farmers constitute a small proportion 
of all voters.  The probability of downzoning also increases when a community has 
experienced rapid population growth and increased land values.  It is more likely to be 
found in municipalities that have enacted right-to-farm ordinances, suggesting an overall 
preservation focus on the part of the community along with some sensitivity to farmers’ 
concerns. 
 
Key words:  Downzoning, local government, takings, land use regulation, open space, 
fiscal impact, political economy.
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Many suburban communities in the US have grown rapidly since World War II, while 
their nearby central cities have declined in population.   The resulting loss of open space 
and farmland, the perceived higher property taxes due to infrastructure and service costs 
associated with growth, concerns about traffic congestion, and fears about declining 
school quality have led to a greater desire to manage growth.  Various growth 
management tools have emerged in the past few decades, including the purchase of 
development rights (PDR) on agricultural or open land, the transfer of development rights 
(TDR), infrastructure concurrency requirements, development impact fees, clustering 
requirements, urban growth boundaries (UGBs) and combinations thereof.  In highly 
urban New Jersey, an increasing number of municipalities are using their police powers 
to prohibit high density development outright, thus refusing to accommodate at least 
some demand for housing and related infrastructure. 
 
On the east coast, this practice of increasing the minimum permitted residential lot size is 
known as “downzoning.”   The farm community and developers typically oppose the use 
of this planning instrument.  Many farmers see downzoning as a taking, an encroachment 
on their economic rights and a diminution of their retirement nest egg.  Other critics of 
downzoning cite its exclusionary effects, its troubling implications for affordable housing 
and racial segregation.  On the other hand environmentalists, existing town residents, and 
community officials concerned about the long-term financial and ecological viability of 
the town tend to support downzoning, especially when the tax base of the community does not permit a market-based approach to these problems that would leave equity 
intact, e.g., by purchasing land or development rights directly. 
 
Downzoning laws are similar to other laws designed to preserve agriculture, rural 
character, or other historical amenities associated with the status quo.   To the list of 
growth management (land use) tools described above we may add regulatory approaches 
(e.g., right-to-farm ordinances) and business incentives (e.g., farmland assessment and 
technical assistance to agriculture). 
 
Studies have shown that the relative feasibility and choice of each of these approaches 
depends on a set of socio-political factors (Adelaja and Friedman, 1999; Logan, 1976; 
Fischel 1982; Furuseth 1985a, 1985b).   While the relationship between policy choice and 
causal factors has been documented in the cases of farmland  preservation (Furuseth; 
Gardner 1977) and right to farm (Adelaja and Friedman 1999), this has not been done in 
the case of downzoning, easily the most politically contentious preservation tool on the 
list.   Because of its potential welfare effects, landscape effects, and accelerated use in 
places with strong development pressure and high land values, it is essential that planners 
nationwide understand why and where this tool is selected by local governments.  As 
with so many other issues related to urban sprawl, New Jersey seems to be several years 
ahead of other states, providing a glimpse into the future of Smartgrowth that is either a 
shining example or a cautionary lesson, depending on point of view. 
 
  2We hypothesize in this paper that downzoning is a choice variable determined by 
political, economic, social, and environmental concerns.  One set of factors determines 
the decision by a town’s political leadership to forestall future growth, while another 
related ― and perhaps overlapping ― set of factors determines the choice of policy 
instrument used.  In particular, the choice between buying or taking land for preservation 
depends on factors such as affordability, the degree of urgency, the importance of timing, 
and the relative political clout of parties on various sides of the debate.   The growing use 
of downzoning and the associated political turmoil suggests the need to effectively 
understand the process leading to the choice of this instrument by local decision-makers. 
 
This paper develops a theoretical framework for the motivation to downzone that is based 
on the optimizing behavior of farmers, homeowners, and local elected officials.  The 
relationship between identified determinants and the probability of adoption is then 
estimated using an empirical logit model applied to 214 New Jersey municipalities. 
 
Past Literature and Theoretical Frameworks  
 
Our political economy model is based on the work of Pelzman (1976), Hahn (1990) and 
Campos (1987) on the influence of different interest groups on political or regulatory 
outcomes. The Pelzman-Hahn-Campos (PHC) model is applied to downzoning    In this 
case, two competing interest groups are assumed, the farm community, who along with 
developers may be hurt by downzoning, and homeowners, who comprise the majority of 
non-farm residents who vote.  The opposed interests of these groups in restrictive zoning 
  3must be balanced by the government (Fischel 1985).   The two groups’ economic 
interests are not assumed, but are instead derived using a model of the impact of 
increased minimum lot size on farmer and homeowner equity, respectively.   The two 
pathways by which changes in zoning are modeled to affect land values (externality 
control and elimination of a development option) are similar to those discussed in a 
comprehensive review of the empirical literature by Pogodzinski and Sass (1991). 
 
An economic model of the impact of downzoning on the land values of farmers and 
homeowners 
 
Why farmers and homeowners? 
William Fischel (1985) lays out a Coasian bargaining model in which “landowner-
developers” benefit from zoning that is more lenient, while “preexisting residents of the 
community” benefit from zoning that is more restrictive.  Each party faces declining 
marginal benefits if it succeeds in moving the system of local zoning entitlements in the 
direction that it prefers.   The question is which level of zoning restrictiveness the 
community will pick, given the possibility of side payments and transaction costs in the 
market for the collective property right known as zoning. 
 
Fischel’s description of the political landscape matches up well with what we observe in 
New Jersey today.  In the local fight over larger minimum lot sizes (“more restrictive 
zoning” in Fischel’s terminology), farmers and developers typically oppose the increased 
  4restrictions.  Homeowners with little interest in developing their holdings are the main 
force behind making zoning more restrictive by increasing lot sizes.
1
 
As useful as it is for thinking about legal and political approaches to zoning, Fischel’s 
1985 book does not fully explain why these two ideal groups have such different interests 
in the first place, and exactly how they can be distinguished from each other on 
theoretical grounds.
2   That is our goal in this section. 
 
If we construct a formal model of the economic interests of Fischel’s two groups, relating 
net worth or total utility to lot size restrictions, we should have a model we can use for a 
variety of purposes.  We can characterize potential winners and losers from downzoning 
according to their fundamental economic characteristics and preferences.  This should 
lead to a more nuanced understanding of the political landscape surrounding this issue 
than can be captured by the all-or-nothing categories of “farmer-landowner” and 
“homeowner.”   A careful economic model can also provide a better framework for 
empirical studies of the welfare impacts of many kinds of land use policies ― not just 
downzoning. 
 
                                                 
1 From now on, we shall use the phrase “farmer-landowner” in place of Fischel’s “landowner-developer,” 
and “homeowner” in place of Fischel’s “pre-existing resident.”   This terminology gives a good description 
of the main groups lining up for and against downzoning in New Jersey ― highlighting the different 
economic perspectives of two distinct groups of pre-existing residents.  
2 This was not Fischel’s purpose.  Instead, he inferred from observed political behavior that landowner-
developers and existing residents must have diametrically opposed interests in the level of zoning 
restrictiveness, at least “over the range of restrictiveness that characterizes most zoning disputes” (Fischel, 
1985, p. 130, top).  This observation was adequate for his purposes, because he was interested in exploring 
the political and legal behavior that emerges once we know that two local groups have conflicting interests 
in the level of zoning restrictiveness. 
  5By clarifying the personal welfare effects of policy change and the pathways these effects 
take, we should be able to provide new insights into factors that affect the slope and level 
of Fischel’s “willingness to pay” schedules for zoning restrictiveness on the part of 
different types of voters.   This will automatically provide us with insights we will use to 
build and test a vote-maximization model driven by what theory predicts will be the 
economic impact of zoning changes on different groups. 
 
Farmer and homeowner land values under different minimum lot sizes 
 
In this paper, we use per-acre land value as a proxy for each voter’s utility.  Although 
land value is clearly a narrower definition of welfare than utility, its use is justifiable in a 
study of local political economy because it is the most important aspect of economic 
welfare affected by local political decision-making.  Family satisfaction and earnings 
from a job to which residents commute are obviously outside of local control, while 
many determinants of local welfare (such as access to a high-quality public school 
system, amenities, or retail services) will be capitalized into land values.  Fischel (1985) 
proposes that elected officials seek to “maximize the net worth of the median voter.”  The 
importance of property value maximization is emphasized further in his recent book, 
“The Homevoter Hypothesis” (2001). 
 
Our model of the impact of downzoning on farmer and homeowner wealth is based on a 
capitalization framework for determining the price of land at any initial time t when the 
community is considering its future zoning.  The capitalization model is compelling in its 
  6simplicity, at least to those trained in basic finance.  In terms of notation, the model 
presented in this section draws heavily on Schmitz and Just (2003) and Plantinga, 
Lubowski, and Stavins (2002). 
 
The price of an acre of developable land owned by a farmer is equal to the present value 
of expected profits from farming until the land is converted to residential use, plus the 
present value of net residential rents received thereafter.   The date of conversion to 
residential use is a decision variable chosen to maximize the present value of the entire 
stream of payments.  Conversion to residential use takes place as soon as the present 
value of expected residential profits (net of conversion costs, which may be financed) 
exceeds the present value of agricultural profits going forward and the option value of 
waiting to develop at a still later date (Plantinga, Luibowski and Stavins, 2002; Capozza 
and Helsley, 1990).  In other words, conversion occurs as soon as the economic benefits 
exceed the opportunity costs.  We make the usual assumption that residential 
development is irreversible, and denote the date of conversion as t*.  Conversion date t* 
will be a function of the farm’s location within the metropolitan area, the pace and 
direction of urban development, and unknowable future changes in agricultural markets. 
 
One important insight of our model is that the economic perspective of homeowners is 
virtually identical to that of the farmer-landowner, with the result that land prices in 
already-developed residential districts are determined in much the same way as in 
agricultural districts.  All homeowners retain the right to subdivide (develop) their 
property to the extent permitted by law.  Every homeowner is therefore a potential 
  7developer, just like farmers and speculators.  On the other side of the coin, every farmer 
derives utility from his homestead as an owner-occupier, cares about the aesthetics of the 
neighborhood (both before and after the decision to develop), and cares about the net 
fiscal costs of developments elsewhere in the community. 
 
Formally, we may specify the per-acre price of the farmer’s total holdings at time t as 






t ∞ → → ∞ → + + =
* * * max       ( 1 )  
and the per-acre price of the homeowner’s total holdings at time t as 






t ∞ → ∞ → + =
* * max          ( 2 )  
where is a discounted stream of imputed rent derived by the owner from living on 
the site,  is a discounted stream of agricultural profits, and  is the discounted 
stream of net profits from future development.  The presence of  and  in both 
equations highlights similarities in the incentives facing both types of landowner.   
Conceptually, one can argue that the only difference between the farmer and the 
homeowner at time t is that the farmer’s 500-acre “backyard” has a feasible economic use 
beyond the provision of amenity benefits to the farm family, while the homeowner cannot 
use a ½-acre backyard the same way (which is not to say that she would want to even if 
she could).  This economic use is captured by the term  . 
∞ → t H
* t t A
→ ∞ →
* t D
∞ → t H
∞ →
* t D
* t t A
→
 
Thus farmer-landowners and homeowners are not clear-cut categories, but instead ideal 
types that sit along a continuum that is defined by (1) the amount of open land around 
their homes, and (2) whether they prefer to use that land for personal benefit or for formal 
  8market activities, including subdivision.  The latter distinction is a simple microeconomic 
choice driven by budget constraints and indifference curves in the normal manner. 
 
This discussion has real practical importance in New Jersey, because of the increasing 
number of so-called “hobby farmers” living on “agricultural estates.”   Terms like these 
are more pejorative than they are enlightening.  A quick glance at the previous paragraph 
suggests that hobby farmers will resemble other farmers according to the first criterion 
(amount of open land they have around their homes), but not according to the second one 
(the extent to which they wish to use their land for economic exchange). 
 
We can clarify these distinctions by adding detail to the land value model we have started 
to build.   Let α be a zoning restrictiveness parameter that is equal to 0 when the 
minimum lot size throughout the community is the smallest one consistent with building 
a single-family dwelling (e.g., a tenth of an acre), and equal to 1 when the minimum lot 
size corresponds to an estate that is so large that only farmers or very affluent residents 
could have any use for it (e.g., forty acres).  The lot sizes of parcels that have already 
been subdivided are grandfathered. 
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will argue that this reduction is not large enough to qualify as a “taking.”  The impact of 
downzoning on  is less often talked about. 
H
t P




>0 for both groups because large-lot zoning improves neighborhood 
aesthetics and provides spillover benefits to the current household.   It reduces the 
likelihood that new development will exceed the capacity of municipal infrastructure 
systems, cause traffic, flooding, or environmental problems.  In addition, taxes paid by 
existing residents tend to be lower under large-lot zoning because new residents will pay 
more in property taxes for public goods that are consumed equally by all households (the 
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because farmers’ 
large landholdings insulate them from the negative amenity effects of neighboring 
development.  Farmers have declining marginal utility for open space, an amenity to 
which they already have a great deal of access. 
 





because large-lot zoning in the vicinity of the farm 
will increase the predictability of farming, reduce right-to-farm conflicts, and help create 
critical mass in agricultural support services (Libby 2003).   Many opponents of 





because the reduction in land value makes it more 
difficult for farmers to use their land as collateral.   But this requires us to assume what 






.   Rather than endogenize 
α ∂
∂A
 to land price 





 and that the “collateral effect” (if any) simply 
amplifies the total predicted impact of downzoning on farmland prices ex post without 
  10changing its sign.   This turns a simultaneous model into a recursive one without doing 
much damage to fundamental assumptions. 
 






























 in (2).   
 
We must turn, then, to a discussion of the impact of downzoning on the future stream of 
profits from development for both types of landowner.   For either type, the stream of 
profits from development may be expressed as follows: 
ds D s
t s





*         ( 3 )  
Where  s δ is a discount factor and  s π is expected net profit from development, both 
calculated at time s.   Because  s π is an expected value driven by uncertainties in the 









          ( 4 )  
where l is a continuous index of lot size, lmin is the marketable minimum lot size (e.g., a 
tenth of an acre), lmax is the maximum marketable lot size (e.g., forty acres), and pl is the 
probability that lot size l will be the most profitable lot size at time t* and will therefore 
  11be chosen by the developer.  Once a lot size is chosen on this basis, it is assumed that it 
cannot be changed in the future. 
 
As written, equation (4) describes expected development profits if there is no lot size 
constraint whatsoever.  It can also be used to examine changes in minimum lot sizes 
relative to the status quo (one can simply define lmin as 2 or 3 acres.) 
 
Downzoning can be expected to have two offsetting effects in (4).  On the one hand, we 




π sl  for precisely the same reason that 
α ∂
∂H
>0 for existing 
residents.   Future homebuyers or tenants will benefit from the externality control that a 
higher α brings about, and they should be willing to pay a per-acre premium for access to 
a community with more restrictive zoning.  This assertion holds all else equal, including 
the size of their own lot.
3
 
On the other hand, an increase in α also increases the probability that the most profitable 
lot size at time t* will turn out to be prohibited by law, so that  will turn out 
to be the result of a constrained rather than a true optimum.   This is the main effect that 
the opponents of downzoning focus on: it is the loss of an option.  This option has value 
today, even if the most profitable future lot size is uncertain and might turn out to be 







                                                 
3 We assume for simplicity that downzoning behavior by a single community does not significantly affect 
supply and demand in the regional housing market. 
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When α = 0 in this equation, expected profits are calculated over the full range of 
possible l’s that might be chosen at t*.  When α = 1, only lmax is permitted by law.  40 
acres is the residential lot size if development profits exceed agricultural profits, 
otherwise the land is not developed.  This formulation of expected profits under 
downzoning is mathematically equivalent to one in which πsl = 0 for all l less than the 
new lot size minimum. 
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min
where 0 < α < 1. 
 
The second of these two terms represents the loss of expected profits due to the absence 
of all development options between the old and new lot size minima, while the first term 
represents possible gains in expected profits from the externality premium for residential 
lot sizes that are permitted under the new α > 0.  One of these permitted sizes will be 
chosen by the developer as a constrained optimum, provided that it exceeds agricultural 
opportunity cost. 
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This framework makes an assumption that is conservative for evaluating the potential 
loss to farmer’s equity from downzoning, and that is that there is no hard and fast 
relationship between the lot size chosen by the developer at time t* and per acre profits.  
It is possible, under this model, that one home on twenty acres could return higher net 
rental payments to the landowner than 100 homes on the same twenty acres.  While this 
seems unlikely, it allows for expected profits to be set by future supply and demand 
conditions in the market for housing, rather than by a simple arithmetic rule that says that 
the more houses you are able to build on each acre, the more profit you will earn. 
 
If one wants to argue that the largest lots are unlikely to be the most profitable, one may 




pl .  This assumption increases the likelihood that the most profitable 
lot size at t* will be relatively small, and therefore increases the odds that development 
profits will be the result of a constrained optimum once zoning becomes more restrictive.  
This is reasonable, but it does not change the fact that this is still fundamentally an option 
problem.   The most profitable future residential density is unknown at time t.  
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The current overall lot size (lexisting) puts an upper bound on the lot size that can be offered 
to future homebuyers if the homeowner acts as a developer, while the lower bound of the 
  14integral is the lesser of the existing lot size and the minimum lot size permitted under the 
new zoning.  Assume that lexisting < lmax and that all farmers can supply lmax to the market.  
Market probabilities and expected per-acre payoffs are the same for both groups.  
Clearly, expected development profits are lower for the homeowner than for the farmer 
under any α, due to the homeowner’s inability to pursue options between lexisting and lmax.   
In addition, a given increase in α could easily put the new minimum above the 
homeowner’s existing lot size, eliminating any future marginal effect of α on 
development value.   This will not happen to the farmer until α = 1. 
 
By analogy to (6), we have the following expression for the impact on a single year’s 
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Close examination of expressions (6) and (8) suggests that expected profit lost in year s 
because of loss of the development option can never be larger for homeowners than it is 
for farmers.   On the other hand, the gain in expected development value to farmers from 
the externality effect on future homes could exceed the gain to homeowners because of 
the larger range of lot sizes the farmer is able to bring to market.  In addition, at some 
point a higher α will eliminate all externality-related real estate profits for homeowners 




pl , of 
course, then the larger expected profits perceived by farmers because of externality 
  15effects will be modest, because the subdivision options the farmer possesses that the 
homeowner does not are mostly large lot sizes with small probability weights. 
 
Having explored the impact of downzoning on expected development profits for the two 
types of landowners at time s, it is necessary to restore the time dimension to the 
problem. 
 
Expressions (6) and (8) suggest that the direction and magnitude of the net change in 
expected development profits in year s due to downzoning will be a function of existing 
lot size (especially for homeowners), the extent of the downzoning  α ∂ , and the 
magnitude of any positive externality effect on future residential rents. 
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s    This means that both types of landowners lose per-acre 
development profits as a result of downzoning, but the farmer loses more per-acre profits 
than the homeowner for a given increment in zoning restrictiveness.  This will be true if 
the externality effect of the downzoning is small compared to the option effect, and if the 
increased minimum lot size “crosses over” the homeowner’s current lot size, so that the 
remaining effect on homeowner option value is zero (in practice, this will happen well 
before that point is reached because subdivision actually requires an initial lot size that is 
approximately twice the minimum). 
 
  16Because the discounted stream of earnings is additive and discount factors remain 













        ( 9 )  
 
A problem with this inequality is that it assumes that the optimal time of conversion, t* 
does not change when α changes, and it gives no indication that t* might be different for 
farmers than it is for homeowners.  The endogeneity of t* to α is a complex topic that we 
shall sidestep for now.
4   As for an optimal time of development t* that is different for 
homeowners than it is for farmers, we believe this is likely.  By definition, homeowners 
value the personal amenity use of their undeveloped acreage to a greater extent than do 
farmers.   The best way to think about this pure preference is that it generates a higher 
opportunity cost to residential subdivision for homeowners than for farmers, leading to a 
t* that occurs much later, if at all.  Profit opportunities driven by urbanization must be 
truly massive for most homeowners to exercise their subdivision option. 
 
                                                 
4 There are two pathways by which t* could change with a change in α.  First, any reduction in expected 
profits from development should make agriculture more competitive with residential development at any 
time s, and therefore postpone conversion until development pressure becomes even more intense at a 







.   Second, to the extent that conversion is postponed because of 
expected property appreciation (and not simply because development profits do not yet exceed the 
agricultural hurdle rate), expectations of appreciation may be reduced by the new zoning, and conversion 







.   In this case, the other 
opportunity cost to residential development ― the foregone value of the option to enjoy continued 
appreciation―goes down.   Because the prediction on t* goes both ways, we shall ignore it for now and 
consider t* to be fixed.   Moreover, our main concern is not whether t* changes as a function of α, but 
rather if t* changes as a function of α in a way that differs between farmers and homeowners.   It is not 
obvious that it will. 
  17In this view, net reductions in  because of downzoning occur further out in time, and 
are discounted more heavily than similar reductions for farmers.  Inequality (9) holds 
with even more certainty.  The role played by the expectation of lower development 
profits is reduced for homeowners, making it less likely that such reductions will offset 




If we relax our assumption that a single minimum lot size must prevail throughout the 
entire community, we must also acknowledge that homeowners have the ability to 
downzone the agricultural zone without affecting subdivision options in their own 
neighborhood.  This would eliminate any loss to homeowners from the loss of their own 
subdivision rights.  We believe that this often happens in practice, but we shall continue 
to motivate our model of local political behavior using universal incentives and 
community-wide zoning. 
 
The final possible contributor to the difference in wealth effects from downzoning is the 
simple fact that farmers own more land than homeowners.   All this does, however, is 










over the number of total 
acres held by the landowner.   The sign of these two partials remains the key determinant 
of each landowner’s opinion of downzoning, for or against.  One can argue that because 
real estate constitutes the primary asset for both types of landowner, it is the percentage 
change in value of the nest egg that matters, and this is equivalent to the change in price 
per acre.  Empirically, we shall still explore whether a large number of acres per farmer 
has an extra deterrent effect on the downzoning decision. 
  18 










.   We 
cannot prove that this partial derivative is negative for farmers and positive for 
homeowners, because those labels do not have clear, quantifiable meanings.   What we 
can do is describe typical farmer characteristics that lead to a prediction of reduced land 
values from increased α and typical homeowner characteristics that lead to a prediction of 
increased land values from increased α.   This helps give Fischel’s observation about 
opposing interest groups a microeconomic foundation, some economic reasonableness.   
It does not, however, eliminate a certain circularity in the reasoning: those we observe 
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.   
“Economic reasonableness” remains a contribution, however, because some argue that 
wealth losses from downzoning never occur, so that even the most strident opponents of 
the policy are victims of a grand delusion about their own economic welfare. 
 
Our conclusions from this section are as follows. 
•  Farmers are less likely to experience a positive impact on current land value from 
downzoning than homeowners because their large parcels are more effectively 
buffered against community-wide disamenities before the time of conversion 
•  Homeowners will experience a lower decline than farmers in expected 
development profits from downzoning because their preferences lead them to 
subdivide their land much later, other things equal, and thus the negative impacts 
will be deeply discounted 
  19•  Many homeowners will not be affected at all by the loss of development options 
because they are already at the minimum lot size, or because a given increase in α 
quickly puts them under the threshold for subdivision.  If homeowners succeed in 
downzoning only farmers’ land, of course, they would not be affected at all by 
loss of the development option. 
•  The closer α is to 1, the greater the loss in expected profits due to the loss of the 
option, and the less the gain in expected profits due to externality benefits 
accruing to future homebuyers in the subdivision.  This is because externality-
driven gains are available only for lot sizes that are permitted after the zoning 
change; so the smaller the range of lot sizes permitted in the future, the smaller 
the impact of this effect.   [As the value of one integral rises, the other falls within 
the full range of lot sizes l in 6 and 8.]   This effect applies especially to farmers, 
who are the only ones with actionable development rights that could be lost at 
high levels of α. 
•  The model also raises the interesting possibility that there could be net gains in 
future development profits and present land prices due to small, initial increments 
in α, before net effects turn negative.  This will be more likely under the 









sl , i.e., that there are diminishing returns in 
the externality effect on future development profits at any lot size l. 
•  The greater the likelihood that smaller lot sizes will be the most profitable ones in 
the future, the greater the chance that the new constraint will bind and that future 
profits will be reduced by the downzoning.   However, any downzoning must 
  20eliminate an economically valuable option, due to the inherent uncertainty of 
housing markets. 
 













 for identifiable farmer and homeowner groups. 
 
 
Elected officials’ choice of α 
 
The government comprises elected representatives of the people, both farm and non-
farm.  It behaves rationally in the sense that it only decides on such measures (or 
legislation) as it believes would raise its electoral prospects.  The utility function of the 
government may thus be regarded the same as the expected total vote function: 
) ; , , ( ) ; , ( Ω Π + Π = = υ α θ γ α
n n f G y N F V u      (10) 
where F = voting population of farm households, N = voting population of non-farm 
households,  A
i  = probability that the average i
th group household will vote for the 
government, i = f, n;  ( = an index of the political clout of the farm households, L = an 
index of the political clout of the non-farm households,  2, S = other exogenous variables 
that may influence A
i.  
 












, it follows that 
and  .   Following Fischel (1985), we assume that there are diminishing 
returns in the relationship of land value to zoning restrictiveness, such that  and 
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In order for (11) to define a maximum, the second order condition must hold: 




Π + Π =
2
2
       ( 1 2 )  
Given the earlier assumptions, this expression is negative such that the condition in (11) 
unambiguously defines a maximum. 
 
We can now find the optimal level of zoning restrictiveness, α*, that elected officials will 
select in order to maximize votes, as a function of the exogenous variables.   To do this, 
we totally differentiate equation (11): 
dN d N dy N d F d dF dV
n n n n
y
f f
n α αυ α αγ α α υ γ α φ Π + Π + Π + Π + + Π =    (13) 
where    . 0 < Π + Π =
n f N F αα αα φ



























































        ( 1 8 )  
The signs on (14) and (15) confirm the basic political intuition that the higher the ratio of 
homeowners to farmers in the community, the greater the likelihood of downzoning.   
The political clout variables, γ and υ, “amplify” the voting power of one group or 
another, either through the group’s influence on voters in its class (as specified here) or 
directly on elected officials (16 and 17).   Higher income on the part of homeowners 
increases their demand for the amenity and fiscal benefits that downzoning can provide 
(17). 
 
Empirical Test of the Political Model of Downzoning 
Data Collection and Hypotheses 
α* is actually a continuous variable: the elected official may select any minimum lot size 
between lmin and lmax.    When we conducted our zoning survey of New Jersey municipal 
governments, we asked about minimum residential lot sizes “before” and “after” any 
downzoning.  This information might allow us to estimate the political determinants of 
α* specified as a continuous variable.   Not every municipality provided this information, 
however; when they did it was often in the form of multiple lot sizes for different zoning 
classifications.   We shall therefore evaluate causes of the decision to downzone as a 
dichotomous variable: yes=1 and no=0. 
 
  23In the spring of 2004, we telephoned the main office of every municipal government in 
New Jersey outside of the fully urbanized, built-out portion of the state.  Entire counties 
like Hudson next to New York City were omitted; built-out municipalities in counties 
like Passaic and Camden were identified using a road map.   Municipalities in the 
Pinelands preservation area were also omitted because zoning there is subject to special 
state control. 
 
We called 278 of New Jersey’s 566 municipalities.   259 responded to our survey, a 
response rate of 93%.  We asked respondents whether they had passed a downzoning 
ordinance that significantly increased minimum lot sizes in the undeveloped portion of 
the community at any time since 1995, when state experts began to notice a sharp 
upswing in the practice.   We were interested in the respondents’ opinions about the 
concept “significant,” but we also provided numerical thresholds to define this word.  We 
suggested that an increase in minimum lot size of 50% or one acre, and extending over at 
least 1% of the municipality’s land area, would qualify as significant.   Most reported 
downzonings exceeded these thresholds easily: communities typically change their 
zoning as part of a master plan update, which involves more than mere tinkering.  
Respondents, who were generally zoning administrators, answered yes or no to the 
downzoning question.  If the answer was yes, they provided us the date of the 








Variable Acronym N Mean N Mean significantly
different?
Political economy variables
Farmers as % of all occupations in 1990 fpct90 200 0.02 89 0.02 yes
Average farm size in 1992 farmsize 135 144.78 85 302.85 yes
Median household income in 1999 medhhi99 200 61211.84 89 74302.16 yes
Right to farm law (0=none, 1=weak, 2=strong) RTFTYPE 130 0.32 84 0.68 yes
Percent residents who were owner-occupiers in 1990 OWNOCC 200 73.63 89 82.25 yes
Lands at risk variables
Open land as % total buildable acreage 1995 open 200 33.77 89 67.11 yes
(Open land %)^2 open2 200 1948.34 89 4931.95 yes
Woods and wetlands as % of undeveloped land in 1995 wwood 200 69.37 89 65.05
Percentage change in population, 1990-1994 CHGPOP 130 12.08 84 27.07 yes
Percentage change in average residential valuation, 1990-1994 CHGRSVA 130 89.19 84 94.47
Percentage of open, developable land in 1986 that had developed by 1995 dpct 200 20.04 89 7.98 yes
Other political variables
Acres of farmland preserved or pending, 1994 APACRES 130 81.92 84 196.25
Percentage of municipal governing body Democrat in 1994 MUNDEM 130 28.51 84 17.33
Equalized property tax rate in 1995 eqtax95 200 2.21 89 2.09
Per-capita public debt in 1990 pcdebt90 200 65.56 89 42.12
Managers and professionals as % of residents with occupations in 1990 whitec 200 28.75 89 31.16
Percentage of residents over 65 years of age plus65 200 14.32 89 10.99 yes
Sources:
     Occupational counts, housing tenure, age, and income: Decennial Census
     Farm size and PDR acres: Reports of NJ Dept. of Agriculture
     Right to farm: Adelaja and Friedman 1999.
     1986 and 1995 land cover data: NJ Office of Smartgrowth
     Data on municipal budgets and political parties: NJ Legislative District 
                      Data Book, 1996
Downzoning = 0 Downzoning = 1
 
 
We collected independent variables from a number of sources and divided them into 
three groups corresponding to our theoretical framework.   The independent variables are 
shown in Table 1, along with the means for each downzoning classification and results of 
a 5% t-test for difference of the means.  This provides a rough test of the relationship of 
each variable to the downzoning decision without imposing ceteris paribus. 
 
The political economy variables come directly from our model as shown in (14) through 
(18).  The most important of these is the number of farmers as a percentage of all 
residents with occupations (FPCT90).   We expect this variable to have a negative impact 
on the probability of downzoning, other things equal.   Average farm size (FARM SIZE) 
should also have a negative impact, because it reflects a larger potential asset loss for 
  25farmers (although as we have argued, a fixed percentage reduction on even a small farm 
is politically important).   RTFTYPE is a variable with three levels: 0 for no right-to-farm 
law, 1 for a weak right-to-farm law, and 2 for a strong right-to-farm law (Adelaja and 
Friedman 1999).  We include this variable as a measure of farmers’ political clout.   The 
greater the farmers’ political clout, the more likely the municipality will have passed a 
strong RTF law, which helps farmers.   Viewed this way, the predicted impact of this 
variable on the probability of downzoning is negative. 
 
Median household income in 1999 (MEDHHI99) should have a positive impact on the 
probability of downzoning following the prediction in inequality (17).   The higher the 
percentage of voters who are owner-occupiers (OWNOCC), the more likely they are to 
use the political system to protect their housing asset.   OWNOCC is predicted to have a 
positive coefficient.   MEDHHI99 and OWNOCC are assumed to measure the status of 
non-farmers, who make up the vast majority of voters in most towns; FPCT90 controls 
for situations where this is not the case.  
 
The second category of variables is labeled lands at risk.    These variables reflect the 
common sense idea that downzoning, like any controversial decision by public officials, 
will be implemented in response to a perceived problem, not when there is no problem on 
the horizon.   While it is true that equations (6) and (8) describe changes in land values 
from downzoning that can be expected today no matter when development is expected to 
take place, the fact is that downzoning merely guarantees a particular externality regime, 
  26it does not create one directly.
5   This guarantee has greater value, and becomes more 
urgent, when the rural landscape is actually expected to change.   Without significant 
development pressure, homeowners will address more urgent priorities than downzoning, 
while elected officials will be unwilling to expend political capital to focus on such a 
long-term issue.  Farmers, for their part, are happy with the status quo, so theirs is not the 
behavior that needs to be explained when development pressure increases.   Development 
pressure reduces t*, and therefore magnifies the development profit effect for both groups 
because of discounting (equations 6 and 8), while bringing forward in time the expected 
negative effects on existing homeowners.    
 
Thus we may expect the opposed interests of the two groups to intensify as a result of 
impending development, but it seems logical that rapid growth will cause homeowners to 
put downzoning on the local agenda in the first place.  Therefore we hypothesize a 
positive coefficient for those variables in Table 1 that describe recent growth in 
population, growth in residential value, and loss of existing open space. 
 
If most of the community’s open space is already gone, of course, there is nothing left to 
protect.   We therefore hypothesize a positive coefficient on open space as a proportion of 
the community’s land that is either developed or undeveloped in 1995 (OPEN).   We 
include a squared term for this variable to account for the possibility that when there is a 
great deal of open space it is not viewed as being at risk; when there is very little open 
space it is regarded as a lost cause; when it is in-between these two extremes 
                                                 
5 And even that guarantee is not secure, as we assume throughout this paper.   Zoning can be changed by a 
future governing body. 
  27homeowners will decide to take action.   Note the importance of including OPEN in 
addition to variables that describe urgency due to recent growth: growth rates do not 
necessarily correlate with the amount of open space remaining in a town at a given time.   
Finally, we include data on woodlands and wetlands (WWOOD) in order to capture 
environmental motivations that differ from the more self-interested “growth control” 
motivations we have focused on so far (Adelaja and Friedman 1999). 
 
The last category of regressors includes political variables that are logical, but are not 
specified directly in (14) through (18) above.   We have data on existing acres in the 
state’s purchase of development rights (PDR) program (APACRES).   An interesting 
question is whether downzoning is viewed by local voters as a complement or a substitute 
for the PDR program, which involves compensation.  It should be noted that local voters 
do not administer the state PDR program, and do not pay directly for local development 
rights retired under this program.  Local elected officials may, however, have some 
influence over which farms are enrolled.   We hypothesize that use of PDR and 
downzoning will occur together in the same communities.  Even though PDR is more 
farmer-friendly because of its compensation mechanism, the key consideration will likely 
be whether a particular community is preservation-minded or not.   If so, we should 
observe preserved farms and regulatory mechanisms like downzoning in the same places. 
 
The percentage of the governing body that is Democratic is hypothesized to increase the 
probability of downzoning because of the property rights ideology adhered to by many 
Republicans.   The proportion of residents who hold white collar (managerial and 
  28professional) jobs is expected to increase the probability of downzoning because of the 
political skills required to mobilize an anti-growth coalition (Logan 1976; Protash and 
Baldassare 1983).   This variable has the same predicted sign as median household 
income.  It is correlated with that variable (p=.70), and could easily have been included as 
a political clout variable for homeowners. 
 
EQTAX95 and PCDEBT90 both measure existing fiscal stress in the community.   A 
high equalized property tax rate is a rough measure of fiscal burden, while per-capita debt 
service is a measure of infrastructure expenditures incurred in the past, possibly making 
voters wary of new capital expenditures.   PLUS65 is the proportion of residents over 65 
years of age.  Senior citizens are notoriously resistant to new expenditures that increase 
property taxes.   Therefore, if downzoning is seen as being a good way to avoid the 
capital costs of new development, or to make sure that each new home pays enough to 




The logit model is specified as  { } { } [ ] ε + = − ∑ k k k yes yes r b DZONE P DZONE P ) ( 1 / ) ( log  
where P(DZONEyes) is the probability that a municipality has downzoned,  is a 
linear combination of k regressors and coefficients, and ε is an independent and normally 
distributed random error term with a mean of zero and a constant variance. 
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  29Table 2. Results of logit model of probability municipality will have downzoned 
since 1995 
 
Estimated Standard Marginal effect
Variable Coefficien error Pr > ChiSq on probability x one st. d
Intercept -7.2481 3.3887 0.0324 ** -1.236992
Political economy model
Farm occupations as % of all occupations in 1990 -34.3882 15.6836 0.0283 ** -5.868838 -0.110743
Average farm size in 1992 -0.00028 0.000837 0.7392 -4.78E-05 -0.013302
Median household income in 1999 0.000023 0.000016 0.1614 3.93E-06 0.082257
Right to farm law (0=none, 1=weak, 2=strong) 0.432 0.2521 0.0866 * 0.073727 0.056957
Percent residents who were owner-occupiers in 1990 0.0039 0.0196 0.8423 0.000666 0.008876
Urgency; land at risk
Open land as % total buildable acreage 1995 0.0946 0.0521 0.0694 * 0.016145 0.492607
(Open land %)^2 -0.00041 0.000456 0.3676 -7E-05 -0.202011
Woods and wetlands as % of undeveloped land in 1995 0.0127 0.0119 0.2821 0.002167 0.04339
Percentage change in population, 1990-1994 0.014 0.00822 0.0874 * 0.002389 0.067108
Percentage change in average residential valuation, 1990-1994 0.0161 0.00901 0.0747 * 0.002748 0.060362
Percentage of open, developable land in 1986 that had developed by 1995 -0.00146 0.0313 0.9628 -0.000249 -0.005292
Other political and policy variables
Acres of farmland preserved or pending, 1994 0.000612 0.000542 0.2584 0.000104 0.041722
Percentage of municipal governing body Democrat in 1994 -0.00215 0.00696 0.7573 -0.000367 -0.011365
Equalized property tax rate in 1995 -0.1491 0.5484 0.7857 -0.025446 -0.011664
Per-capita public debt in 1990 0.00461 0.00534 0.3876 0.000787 0.070193
Managers and professionals as % of residents with occupations in 1990 -2.7143 3.9833 0.4956 -0.463234 -0.038907
Percentage of residents over 65 years of age -0.00554 0.0511 0.9136 -0.000945 -0.00551
N = 214  
 
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients, standard errors, and p-values of this model of 
the probability that New Jersey communities adopting downzoning between 1995 and 
2004.  In addition, the marginal effect of each variable on the probability is calculated at 
the mean value of all of the coefficients (see Adelaja and Friedman for the relevant 
formula).   In the final column, this derivative is multiplied by the standard deviation of 
each independent variable, which serves to standardize the result. 
 
The impact of the proportion of residents who are farmers is statistically significant at the 
5% level and is negative, as predicted.   The remaining variables that are significant 
exceed only a 90% confidence level.   The existence of a right-to-farm law is significant 
but positive, suggesting that municipalities that seek to preserve rural character by 
downzoning also hold out to farmers the “olive branch” of nuisance protection.   This is 
  30similar to our hypothesis on the relationship between downzoning and use of the state’s 
purchase of development rights program. 
 
The proportion of developable land that is open, and is therefore at risk to develop at “too 
high” a density, is significant and positive.  Communities act when there is something 
significant to protect, and when a large amount of the community’s built character is up 
in the air.  The sign on the squared version of this variable is negative, as expected, but it 
is not significant at standard confidence levels.  It could be that more observations would 
show that this slope changes sign at some point: if a very large proportion of a 
community is open, its citizens do not worry so much about how it is zoned.    As 
expected, two indicators of impending development pressure are positive and significant 
at the 10% level.   The variable CHGRSVAL reflects the increased stakes that both 
parties have in the protection of their land asset.  In addition, this variable may effectively 
proxy increased property tax payments that feed antigrowth sentiment, as well as an 
increasing cost of acquiring ― rather than re-zoning ― lands at risk.
6
 
While the broadest predictions of our political economy model are confirmed by the 
results in Table 1 ― farmers and homeowners are diametrically opposed on this issue and 
politicians listen to them ― the subtler nuances of the model are not confirmed.  There is 
little evidence that the probability of adoption is affected by homeowners’ income 
                                                 
6 The fiscal interpretation of the CHGRSVAL variable should be treated with caution.   Although actual 
property values may be increasing rapidly, actual re-assessments for tax purposes are infrequent.  And 
because local budgets must balance in New Jersey, tax rates will eventually fall when property is reassessed 
upwards unless the governing body decides to increase spending to take advantage of the increase in the 
base.  Unlike the federal government, tax payments by individuals do not automatically rise when 
economic growth drives an increase in the base, because surpluses are not permitted.  (This note of caution 
applies also to interpretation of the variable EQTAX95.) 
  31elasticity of demand for amenities, the existence of large farms, Democrats in office, or 
fiscal stresses that amplify no-growth sentiment.   Instead, politicians act when there is 
some rural character to be preserved, when growth is just over the horizon, and when 
farmers are a small enough minority that passing a downzoning ordinance wins more 
electoral support than it loses. 
 
While it seems likely that farmers and homeowners experience changes in asset values 
that follow the predictions of our land value model (the political behavior of New 
Jersey’s farmers would be difficult to explain otherwise), it is certainly possible that the 
decision to downzone is driven by more than pure self-interest.  Non-farm homeowners 
act to preserve rural character when it is threatened, farmers oppose this particular 
method, and everything else is just counting noses.   Democracy works as designed: the 
non-farm majority wins.   Precisely specifying the personal economic stake that different 
types of voters have in the outcome does not improve much upon this basic story. 
Conclusion 
In New Jersey, the real power to affect the future use of land is lodged at the local level.  
Downzoning is one among a number of tools that local governments have at their 
disposal.   It is easily the most controversial local land use tool because of the “takings” 
claim made by farmers. 
 
We cannot settle the takings matter without new empirical work, but we have built a 
theoretical model of the impact of downzoning on land values for both farmers and 
homeowners.   Although our model suggests that a net loss for farmers and a net gain for 
  32homeowners is reasonable, it reminds us that homeowners can lose a portion of their 
present value from community-wide downzoning, while farmers can gain a portion.   It 
would be interesting to look at a sample of land values pre- and post-downzoning to see 
whether this conditional nature of predicted land value changes actually holds.   In 
addition, the fact that landowners are never really pure farmers or pure homeowners 
could be addressed more formally using detailed data on individuals.  In this paper we 
rely on an all-or-nothing classification of the two groups because that is how the census 
data come to us. 
 
The second theoretical section of this paper builds a model of politician behavior driven 
by the assumption that downzoning is a zero-sum game between farmers and 
homeowners.  A formal model of vote maximization is used to get partial derivatives on 
the politician’s choice of an optimal zoning-restrictiveness regime as a function of 
exogenous variables. 
 
This model is tested using data on 214 New Jersey municipalities.  The most important 
prediction of the political economy model ― the fundamentally opposing interest that 
farmers and homeowners have in downzoning ― is confirmed by the data, although the 
model does not provide strong corroborating evidence of economic self-interest on the 
part of non-farmers.  Regardless of motivation, we may expect continued conflict over 
zoning rights between shrinking farmer minorities and growing homeowner majorities in 
places with population growth and rapidly-rising land values.◙ 
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